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Kim (1993) applies his ‘exclusion argument’ to logically rule out that mental information can be 
causal. (Note that this argument could also be used to argue that genetic information is 
epiphenomenal, though no one argues that, probably because we understand the genetic code). 
The argument rests on a premise of the causal closure of the physical. “Causal closure” means 
that causality at the level of particles is sufficient to account for all outcomes and interactions at 
the level of particles. Kim (2005, p. 17), applying Occam’s razor, advocates the “exclusion of 
over-determination” when modeling physical causation. In his words: “If event e has a sufficient 
cause c at t, no event at t distinct from c can be a cause of e.” Note that without the sufficiency of 
c, Kim cannot apply the “exclusion of over-determination” principle, so cannot rule out mental 
causation. The sufficiency of c is crucial if the exclusion argument is to succeed at excluding 
mental causation. If particle-level causality is sufficient to account for particle behavior, and 
neurons are made of particles, mental events, assuming that they supervene on neuronal events, 
can play no causal role in neuronal behavior. In other words, mental events cannot cause 
fundamental particles to behave differently than they otherwise would have if they had only 
interacted according to the laws obeyed by particles. 
Put succinctly (Kim, 1993, pp. 206–210): If (i) the “realization thesis” is the case, then each 
mental state is synchronically determined by underlying microphysical states, and if (ii) “the 
causal or dynamical closure of the physical thesis” is the case, then all microphysical states are 
completely diachronically necessitated by antecedent microphysical states, then it follows that 
(iii) there is no causal work left for mental states as such to do. If the logic here is valid, then 
only if either (i) or (ii) is incorrect, is there potentially room to develop a theory of mental 
causation. So any theory of mental causation that attempts to meet “Kim’s challenge” must 
explicitly state which premise, (i) and/or (ii), is incorrect. 
If quantum domain indeterminism is correct then (ii) is incorrect, because any particular 
present microphysical state is not necessitated by its antecedent microphysical state or states. In 
other words the traditional definition of causal closure that “every physical event has an 
immediately antecedent sufficient physical cause” is not satisfied, because when a cause c can be 
indeterministically followed by any number of possible effects ei, then c is not a sufficient cause 
of any of the possible ei, because they might not happen if they have not yet happened, and they 
might not have happened even after they have happened. Papineau (2008) tries to handle the 
problem of causal non-sufficiency of c introduced by indeterminism by appending a qualifier to 
the more traditional definition of causal closure as follows: “Every physical effect has an 
immediate sufficient physical cause, in so far as it has a sufficient physical cause at all.” A similar 
attempt to make─in this case Davidson’s─definition of causal closure consistent with 
indeterminism is to say that ‘every physical event that has an explanation has a physical 
explanation’. But neither of these attempts to dodge the non-sufficiency of c imposed by 
indeterminism gives existing physical explanations enough credit. Quantum-domain effects are 
not unexplained. It is not the case that just anything can happen inexplicably. Rather, the set of 
possible outcomes and their likelihoods of occurrence are very precisely defined by quantum 
theory, arguably the most accurately predictive theory in the history of science.   
Classical deterministic laws are laws among sufficiently causal actualia, where both c at t1 and e 
at t2 are actual events. Quantum mechanical laws are deterministic at the level of possibilia, but 
indeterministic at the level of actualia, because which possible outcome will occur upon 
measurement is only probabilistically specifiable. Nonetheless, under quantum mechanics c is 
sufficiently causal of its entire set of possible outcomes ei with their associated probabilities of 
occurring. It is just that c is not a sufficient cause of any particular one of its many possible 
effects that happens to happen when measured. Classical deterministic and modern quantum 
mechanical laws both operate deterministically, and causation is sufficient, but over different 
types of physical entities. Actualia and possibilia, while both physical, have mutually exclusive 
properties. Actualia are real and exist now or in some past moment; they have a probability of 1 
of happening or having happened. Possibilia are not yet real and may never become real, and 
exist in the future relative to some c, and have a probability of happening between zero and one. 
A given event cannot be both actual and possible at the same time. 
Closure, therefore, applies to different types of physical events under ontological determinism 
and indeterminism. “Closure” entails that the set of physical events is closed; Any particular 
effect will be a member of the same set to which a sufficient cause itself belongs. Determinism is 
closed at the level of actualia; Any particular cause or effect will be a member of the set of all 
actual events in the universe across all time. Indeterminism, in contrast, is not closed at the level 
of actualia because a non-sufficient actual cause and one of its possible outcomes that may never 
happen are not both members of the set of actualia. Rather, quantum theory is closed (and 
deterministic) at the level of possibilia: Any particular outcome or event will be a member of the 
set of all possible outcomes or events in the universe across all time, and any possible cause is 
sufficient to account for the set of all of its possible effects. Under indeterminism physical 
explanations are of a different type than under determinism, though both actualia and possibilia 
are physical, and theories of either are physical explanations. 
An indeterministic causal closure thesis could be restated as follows: “(ii*) the set of all possible 
microphysical states is completely diachronically necessitated by antecedent possible 
microphysical states.” The realization thesis for the indeterministic case might be: “(i*) all 
mental states are synchronically determined by underlying sets of possible microphysical 
states.” But claim (i*) is contrary to the definition of supervenience. Mental events do not 
supervene on sets of possible physical states, they supervene on specific, actually occurring 
physical states. Since it is absurd to maintain that mental events synchronically supervene on 
sets of possibilia, we can rule (i*) out. It remains to be shown whether (i), i.e. supervenience on 
actualia, can be combined with (ii*), i.e. causal sufficiency and closure among possibilia, to yield 
(iii). 
An actual microphysical state and the set of all possible microphysical states are different kinds 
with mutually exclusive properties (e.g., real/~real; present/~present). The essentially 
syllogistic structure of the exclusion argument requires staying within a logical kind. It is 
logically valid to draw from the major premise (ii) ‘All physical events are caused by preceding 
sufficient physical causes’ and the minor premise (i) ‘mental events are realized in physical 
events’ the conclusion (iii) that ‘the physical events that realize mental events have preceding 
sufficient physical causes’. But now we are splitting ‘physical’ into two types with mutually 
exclusive properties, possibilia and actualia. The conclusion (iii) of the syllogism holds only if 
both the major and minor premises hold and are both are about actualia as in (ii) and (i), or 
both are about possibilia as in (ii*) and (i*). If one premise is about possibilia and the other 
about actualia, the conclusion does not follow, because the premises are about exclusive entities. 
For example, (ii) and (i*) would read ‘All actual physical events are caused by preceding 
sufficient actual physical causes’ and ‘mental events are realized in sets of possible physical 
events,’ which violates syllogistic logic as much as ‘all men are mortal’ and ‘Socrates is a robot’. 
Conversely, (ii*) and (i) would read ‘The set of possible physical events are caused by preceding 
sufficient possible physical causes’ and ‘mental events are realized in actual physical events,’ 
which similarly violates syllogistic logical form. 
There is another argument that (i) with (ii*) cannot logically entail (iii). Obviously, causes must 
precede effects. The usual exclusion argument is that (ii) diachronic actual elementary particle 
interactions preceding the moment t of (i) synchronic mental supervenience on actual particle 
configuration p leaves no room for mental events as such to have any causal effect since those 
preceding physical interactions are sufficient to cause p. However, if (ii*) is taken to refer to a 
diachronic set of possible events preceding (i) mental supervenience on p, then there is a 
problem, because possibilia do not exist in the past of p, only actual events, such as those 
described in (ii) do. Once we have reached time t and p is not a possibility but an actuality, then 
all events prior to t must also be actual. Events in the past are actual events that happened and 
are no longer possible. If they were possible they would lie in the future. Possibilia only exist in 
the future relative to some actual or possible event. But p we agree is actual since supervenience 
makes no sense for possibilia, as in (i*), which we have rejected. Alternatively, if we want to 
think of the possibilia in (ii*) ‘collapsing’ into p, where p was one among many possibilities, 
much like the quantum mechanical collapse of the wave function, we are again left with the 
problem that the set of possibilia is not sufficient to cause p per se, because p might not have 
happened at all and some other possible outcome might instead have happened. However, if the 
possibilia in (ii*) are taken to temporally follow (i) the actual p at t, well, that is certainly 
consistent with the idea that possibilia can exist in the future of p. But then possibilia in the 
future of p would be seen as being sufficiently causal of p, which would entail impossible 
backward causation in time. Thus the possibilia described in (ii*) can neither pre- nor post-cede 
the actualia described in (i) and be sufficiently causal of them. In sum, (i) and (ii*) do not 
together entail (iii), whether on logical (syllogistic) grounds or on the grounds that possibilities 
can only exist in the future and not in the past of actual events such as those on which mental 
events supervene. In conclusion, assuming indeterminism, mental causation is not logically 
ruled out by Kim’s argument. 
Neil Levy wrote that this argument “…is badly confused. It rests on a misunderstanding 
regarding the causal closure principle. Tse understands the principle to claim that physical 
causes are sufficient for the occurrence of physical effects. If indeterminism is true, then 
physical causes sometimes or often are not sufficient for the occurrence of later events. Tse 
therefore concludes that the closure principle is false for indeterministic systems, so it is no 
obstacle to mental causation. But the causal closure principle is, roughly, the principle that 
physical events can be accounted for by physical causes, or (equivalently) that physics is causally 
complete. It is silent on whether physics is deterministic or not. The brain may be 
indeterministic; causal closure remains an obstacle to mental causation.” 
In response, I did not invent the definition of causal closure as “every physical effect having an 
immediately antecedent sufficient physical cause”; many philosophers have written variants of 
just such a definition, including Papineau and Kim, cited above. If we eliminate the requirement 
that c be sufficient to cause its physical effects, we lose Kim’s elegant “exclusion of over-
determination” argument against any possible causal role of the mental, and can no longer rule 
that out. In addition, as a physicalist I agree that “physical events can be accounted for by 
physical causes”. But there is an ambiguity in Levy’s phrase “accounted for” here. Deterministic 
physical laws account non-probabalistically (or with a probability of 1) for a deterministic 
succession among actualia, whereas indeterministic physical laws account probabilistically for 
an indeterministic succession among actualia; Or, as is the case with the evolution of the wave 
function in quantum mechanics, physical laws account deterministically for a changing 
probability distribution of possible outcomes of measurements. If we are to take the idea of 
closure of the physical seriously, then a physical cause c and its physical effect(s) must belong to 
the same closed set. We agree that this closed set includes only physical events whether 
determinism or indeterminism is the case. But under determinism that closed set of physical 
events includes physical actualia across time whereas under indeterminism it includes physical 
possibilia across time. In principle, classical physics is a causally complete account of the 
sequence of actualia over time, and quantum physics is a causally complete account of the 
sequence of possibilia over time. But standard versions of quantum physics do not give a 
complete account explaining why one possible outcome becomes actual upon measurement 
rather than other possible outcomes that did not occur. It just happens, with no reason given 
beyond chance. If c does not provide sufficient grounds for why one possible outcome occurs 
over another, exclusion of overdetermination cannot be used to rule out the possibility that the 
physical realization of present mental events might bias which particle possibilia will become 
actualia in the imminent future. Note that this does not require positing any bizarre notions like 
consciousness collapsing the wave packet. It just requires that present physically realized 
informational criteria placed on inputs can be met in the future in multiple possible ways.    
 
 
